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This paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We 
introduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents’ 
desire for, or peer pressure towards, social efficiency. In a simple model of team production 
we examine the interplay of different types of contracts with social norms. We show that one 
and the same norm can be output-increasing, neutral, or output-decreasing depending on the 
incentive scheme. We also show how social norms can induce multiplicity of equilibria and 
how steeper economic incentives can reduce effort. 
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1. Introduction
In a world without externalities, there would be no need for society or any kind of
social rules. If one agent’s actions never harmed or kindled another, there would
be no need for rules of conduct, law, or social norms. There would be no relevant
interaction and, thus, no reason for governing it. But the moment there is interac-
tion, the moment agents can inﬂict externalities on each other, norms (of any sort)
become relevant and, typically, desirable. That is, norms are rooted in the presence
of externalities. In this paper, we focus on social norms, i.e., norms that are not for-
mally enforced. We conceptualize such norms as resulting from players having social
preferences that discourage actions causing negative and encourage actions causing
positive externalities on others. However, in contrast to most recent models of social
preferences the strength of social incentives in our framework is endogenous, depend-
ing on the actions of others. This reﬂects the peculiar nature of social norms that,
although everyone might agree with their desirability, nobody might stick to them.
After laying down our general approach to modeling social norms, we proceed
by speciﬁcally applying our framework to production in ﬁrms. The main conclusion
from this analysis is that the impact of one and the same social norm may crucially
depend on the economic incentives that are in place. In fact, one and the same social
norm may be output enhancing, neutral, or output decreasing, depending on the type
of contract chosen by the ﬁrm’s owner. This points to a new and important role of
contract design: By choosing appropriate contracts one can “manage” social norms,
i.e., determine the way norms impact on behavior. As we prove, this oﬀers a new
rationale for team incentives even in the absence of complementaries of eﬀorts. Once
we have laid down our analytical framework, the logic of this result is astonishingly
simple. Consider a ﬁrm where total output is just the sum of all workers’ eﬀorts. (This
will be the lead example throughout our paper.) Under individual piece rates there is
no meaningful interaction between workers, in particular, there are no externalities.
This is crucially diﬀerent under team incentives where agents’ eﬀorts cause positive
externalities on each other. The presence of such externalities triggers the social
norm which, by deﬁnition, encourages actions that induce positive externalities. As
a consequence, social norms will (weakly) enhance a ﬁrm’s productivity under team
incentives.
The opposite is true for incentives based on relative performance such as tourna-
ment incentives. Holding everything else constant–the ﬁrm’s technology and work-
ers’ preferences–we can show that the introduction of relative pay renders the same
social norm, that increased output under team pay, detrimental to the ﬁrm’s perfor-
mance. Remarkably, this is exactly what is found in a ﬁeld experiment by Bandiera,
Barankay, and Rasul (2005). They study fruit pickers working under two diﬀer-Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms 3
ent incentive schemes, a piece rate solely based on own productivity and a relative-
performance scheme. Consistent with our model, they ﬁnd that, as long as fruit
pickers can observe each other’s eﬀort, eﬀorts are much lower under the relative-
performance scheme than under piece rates. They attribute this to workers “inter-
naliz[ing] the negative externality they impose on others under the relative incentive
scheme”.
There are other important consequences of social norms that can be studied for
a given type of incentive scheme. Most importantly, we show that social norms can
naturally give rise to multiplicity of equilibria. Equilibria with low eﬀorts (where
nobody cares much about others because others don’t care much) can coexist with
high-eﬀort equilibria (where everybody cares a lot about others precisely because
everybody else cares a lot). These high-eﬀort equilibria can even induce over-zealous
behavior–as apparently common in many “city ﬁrms” where employees often report
they have to work very long hours (with very little output) simply because everybody
else does.
Multiplicity of equilibria makes it harder to determine optimal incentives. Con-
sider a one-parameter model where the ﬁrm owner simply varies a bonus rate. (This
is the model that we shall consider in our section on team pay.) The highest possible
proﬁt may result from a bonus that induces multiple equilibria which may entail a
high strategic risk. If workers coordinate on the low-eﬀort equilibrium, the ﬁrm may
be better oﬀ to choose a “second-best” bonus rate where eﬀorts are unique. This
also suggests the importance of leadership, that is, of a manager’s ability to motivate
workers to coordinate on a “good” equilibrium, in the presence of multiple equilibria
(under the same pay scheme).
Finally, we show that the presence of social norms may explain one of the bigger
puzzles in economics: why steeper incentives can reduce eﬀorts. These so-called
“crowding eﬀects” of economic incentives, as discussed, for example, in Frey (1997)
or Frey and Jegen (2003)1 have recently attracted wide attention and, by now, there
is a large body of literature documenting such “perverse” incentive eﬀects. In our
framework such eﬀects arise naturally. Suppose team incentives get steeper but agents
still exert the same eﬀort. As a consequence, everybody is now doing less for the
common good, relative to what they could do. This reduces the pressure from the
social norm and agents may, after adjustment to the new equilibrium, exert less eﬀort.
1Drawing on the sociology and psychology literature Frey argues that economic incentives can
crowd out intrinsic motivation. An early example for this eﬀect goes back to Titmuss (1970) who
argues that monetary incentives for blood donations undermine people’s intrinsic willingness to give
blood. In contrast, the argument here is that economic incentives can weaken the eﬀect of a social
norm. Empirically, the two mechanisms might sometimes be hard to distinguish. However, our
simple model oﬀers diverse comparative static predictions that are testable.Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms 4
There are several papers in the economics literature where social norms have
been included in microeconomic analyses.2 However, not many attempts have been
made to study how social norms aﬀect the incentive structure within ﬁrms. The
most prominent paper in this literature is perhaps Kandel and Lazear (1992), who
develop a model of norms in teams. In contrast to our paper, they exclusively focus
on partnerships and proﬁt-sharing schemes and make strong assumptions about the
curvature properties of agents’ social payoﬀ functions ruling out some of the more
intruiging ﬁndings of our study. Bacharach (1999) proposes a theory of agents who
“team reason”, leading to an ideal proﬁle of actions for the team, which is related to
our notion of a social ideal. However, Bacharach does not consider diﬀerent incentive
schemes, nor does he follow up on the consequences of multiplicity. More recently,
and closest to our approach, Fischer and Huddart (2008) consider norms that are
determined by the incentive structure within the ﬁrm, just as in our model. There
are some major diﬀerences between their and our approach, however. Our model
draws upon a general principle of a group or team eﬃciency ideal that depends on the
incentive structure and aﬀects individual choices. By contrast, Fischer and Huddart
distinguish between personal norms and social norms, and between a desirable and
an undesirable action, each with its own norm. Thus, the social norm in their setup is
independent of team eﬃciency; it is instead a conformity norm that only depends on
the actions of others. Another important diﬀerence is that they rule out equilibrium
multiplicity by assuming peer pressure to take a certain form. By contrast, we allow
for multiplicity of equilibria, and we believe that multiplicity may be useful for the
explanation of a number of empirical ﬁndings.3
Regarding the empirical evidence, in addition to Bandiera, Barankey and Rasul
(2005) who study an intriguing ﬁeld experiment, Encinosa, Gaynor, and Rebitzer
(2000) ﬁnd that group norms matter in medical partnerships. Knez and Simester
(2001) provide evidence for the airline industry, and Ichino and Maggi (2000) for
2See e.g. Akerlof (1980), Moﬃtt (1983), Besley and Coate (1992), Bernheim (1994), Lindbeck,
Nyberg and Weibull (1999, 2003), Hart (2001), K¨ ubler (2001), and Vendrick (2003) and the literature
cited in these studies.
3Other papers on soical norms in ﬁrms are Barron and Gjerde (1997). Hart (2001) also focuses
on norms and ﬁrms, but rather deals with the question whether the degree of trust between agents
inﬂuences the optimal ownership structure. Also related is recent work by Rey Biel (2008) who
studies how inequity aversion of agents aﬀects optimal contracts. In the literature on the eﬀect of
social preferences on the optimality of certain contractual arrangements, the work by Bartling (2010)
is most relevant. He compares relative-performance pay with team pay, in a model with inequality
averse agents. Interestingly, in his model the pure incentive eﬀect of other-regarding preferences
compared to standard preferences is negative for team pay and positive for relative performance
evaluation. In contrast, social norms in our setup have the opposite eﬀect on incentives under these
two incentive schemes, which appears to be more in line with empirical evidence.Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms 5
the banking industry.4 The latter study is of particular interest. Ichino and Maggi
report substantial shirking diﬀerentials between branches of a large Italian bank, de-
spite identical monetary incentives governing the employees’ eﬀorts in these branches.
They identify group-interaction eﬀects as a key explanatory variable that allows for
multiple equilibria. This evidence is supplemented by experimental data consistent
with multiplicity. In a laboratory study, Falk, Fischbacher, and G¨ achter (forthcom-
ing) ﬁnd that the same individual contributes more to a public good in a group
with high average contributions than in a group with low contribution levels. Falk
and Ichino (2006) report similar evidence on the eﬀects of peer pressure in a recent
non-laboratory experiment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we develop
an approach to modelling social norms that is intended to be generally applicable,
extending beyond the examples of how norms form and operate in ﬁrms - the topic
of Section 3. Section 4 concludes with a discussion.
2. Modeling social norms
Suppose there is a group or team of n agents, where each agent i chooses an eﬀort
xi ≥ 0. An eﬀort proﬁle thus is a vector   x = (x1,...,xn) ∈ Rn
+. We write (x′
i,x−i)
when others act according to the proﬁle   x while agent i deviates to eﬀort x′
i. Each
eﬀort proﬁle results in both material and social utility to each agent. We take the
total utility to an agent to be the sum of the two:
Ui(  x) = ui(  x) + vi(  x, ˆ x
i), (1)
where both functions are twice diﬀerentiable. The material utility, ui(  x), is meant
to represent agent i’s preferences concerning consumption and eﬀort. Let ˆ X ⊂ Rn
+
be the set of eﬀort proﬁles   x ∈ Rn
+ that result in Pareto eﬃcient material utility
proﬁles.5 By a social ideal we mean an element of ˆ X.
As for the social utility, we assume that each agent has a particular social ideal,
ˆ xi ∈ ˆ X, an action proﬁle that i deems is “in the best joint interest” of the group or
team. This is the second argument in the social-utility term above. We proceed to
specify properties of the social-utility functions vi. First, for each action xi ∈ R+, we
deﬁne the externality that i imposes on the others as the sum of the material utility
4While Encinosa et al. focus on the interplay of group norms, multitasking and risk aversion,
Knez and Simester show that ﬁrm-wide performance goals do have an eﬀect on employees if these
work in small groups, which allows them to monitor each other’s work eﬀort closely.
5That is, eﬀort proﬁles that are not dominated by any other eﬀort proﬁle, in terms of agents’
material payoﬀs.Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms 6















This externality may be negative or positive. For instance, it is negative if i shirks
from the production of some public good while it is positive if i is over-zealous and
exerts more eﬀort than the social ideal calls for. Clearly ψi (ˆ xi) = 0. Secondly, for
any action proﬁle of the others, x−i ∈ R
n−1
+ , we deﬁne the externality that they impose
















Also this externality may be negative or positive and vanishes at the social ideal,
ψ−i (ˆ xi) = 0.
We deﬁne the social utility vi(  x, ˆ xi), associated with any action proﬁle   x ∈ Rn
+
and social ideal ˆ xi ∈ ˆ X, as a function of the two externalities, the one that agent i
imposes upon the others and the one that they impose upon her:
















where gi : R2 → R is twice diﬀerentiable and non-decreasing in its ﬁrst argument,
the externality that agent i imposes on the others. The social utility term, vi(  x, ˆ xi),
is meant to represent agent i’s social preferences, her “moral” preferences concerning
her own eﬀort, in relation to other group members’ eﬀorts and to their common social
ideal. The monotonicity means that an agent obtains a higher level of social utility,
or “moral satisfaction,” the more eﬀort she exerts, ceteris paribus (thereby beneﬁtting
the others in the group or team). This social utility of own eﬀort may also depend on
the eﬀorts made by the others, reﬂected by the second argument of gi. For example,
the closer the others adhere to the social ideal, the stronger may be the social utility
gain from increased own eﬀort. Indeed, in the subsequent applications we will take
this to be the typical case.6 The social utility may be internalized or take the form
of social disapproval from others – external “peer pressure.” The latter evidently
requires that agents can observe or infer each other’s eﬀorts.7 The function gi can
then represent the well-known phenomenon of increased peer pressure when others’
eﬀorts are closer to the social ideal.
6The same assumption is made for a binary choice in Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull (1999).
7In our model, both interpretations are equivalent as the output from agents’ eﬀorts will be
deterministic. With stochastic production, the two interpretations give diﬀerent results.Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms 7
The ﬁrst-order eﬀect of an agent’s unilateral change of eﬀort on her total utility
(1) can be divided into two parts. First, there is a direct eﬀect on her material utility,
and, secondly, there is an indirect eﬀect on her social utility, transmitted through her














The second term is the product of a weight factor and the sum of the eﬀect on all
other’s material utilities, evaluated at their ideal eﬀort levels. The weight factor




















1 denotes the partial derivative of gi with respect to its ﬁrst argument. By
hypothesis, this partial derivative is non-negative. The size of the weight factor thus
depends on (a) how sensitive the agent is to the externality he causes others, (b) on
the externality he causes the others by her action, and (c) the externality they cause
him by their actions.
By hypothesis, other’s material utilities are non-negatively aﬀected by an increase
in i’s eﬀort. Hence, if i’s eﬀort is positive and optimal from his personal viewpoint,
that is, in terms of his total utility and given the others’ eﬀorts, then i’s marginal
material utility is non-positive. It is zero if i is indiﬀerent to the externality he causes
others – as in standard economics models – and it is negative if he cares (somewhat)
about this externality. In the latter case, i exerts more eﬀort than if he was selﬁsh.
In the case of a team, this may be viewed as an expression of “team spirit,” a concern
for the other workers. It is arguably natural to assume that the weight factor is larger
the closer others adhere to the social ideal, that is, that we care more about others’
material well-being if these others contribute more to the common good.
We will apply this general set-up to a variety of commonly used contract forms
within ﬁrms. We will assume that after the contract has been selected by the owner,
each worker chooses his or her eﬀort, without knowing the others’ eﬀort choices,
but with a possible concern for the team. This deﬁnes a two-stage game in which
each worker’s strategy is a rule that speciﬁes the worker’s eﬀort as a function of the
contract selected. The payoﬀ to the owner is taken to be the ﬁrm’s proﬁt and the
payoﬀs to the workers is taken to be their total utilities. We will consider a few
stylized situations of the simplest form.
3. Team pay
The ﬁrm has one owner (or principal) and n identical workers (or agents). The owner
observes the ﬁrm’s output y but not individual eﬀorts. Output is a linear functionSocial Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms 8
of the sum of worker eﬀorts, y = x1 + ... + xn, and each worker is paid w = by/n,
where b ≥ 0 is a bonus rate chosen at the outset by the owner.8 Such a team payment
scheme evidently induces externalities among the workers; each worker will beneﬁt
if a colleague works harder and lose income if a colleague shirks. Workers’ material
utilities are linear-quadratic in income and eﬀort. With a slight abuse of notation,






where ¯ x denotes average eﬀort. It is easily veriﬁed that the eﬀort proﬁle that max-
imizes the sum of all workers expected material utilities is ˆ x = (b,b,...,b). Hence,
we take this as the ideal eﬀort proﬁle of each and every worker i. According to this
ideal, all workers should exert the same eﬀort ˆ xi = b, for any bonus rate b ≥ 0 chosen
by the owner/principal.9 By contrast, a selﬁsh worker i will exert the lower eﬀort
xo
i = b/n.
From (2) and (3) we obtain, again with a slight abuse of notation, that
ψi(b,xi, ˆ x−i) =
b
n
(n − 1)(xi − b) (7)
and






xj − (n − 1)b
￿
. (8)
The social utility to each worker i, from any eﬀort proﬁle   x under any bonus rate
b, is thus




(n − 1)(xi − b),
b
n
(n − 1)(¯ x−i − b)
￿
, (9a)
where ¯ x−i =
￿
j =ixj/(n − 1) is the average eﬀort of the other workers.10 The social
utility to each worker i is thus a function of the bonus rate, b, the number of workers,
n, the worker’s own eﬀort, xi, and others’ average eﬀort, ¯ x−i.
By equation (1), we have now deﬁned each worker’s total utility:














(n − 1)(xi − b),
b
n
(n − 1)(¯ x−i − b)
￿
(10)
8We do not consider contracts that also contain a ﬁxed payment. The main reason is that linear
contracts create free-riding incentives in the most transparent and parsimonious way.
9For an analysis of how eﬀort levels stipulated by a social norm may depend on individuals’
“talents ”, treated as private information, see Dufwenberg and Lundholm (2001).
10Workers being identical, their social payoﬀs are deﬁned by the same function G.Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms 9
The ﬁrm’s proﬁt – the residual left to the owner – is simply










We take the owner to be a risk neutral proﬁt-maximizer.
The interaction takes the form of a two-stage game, where the owner ﬁrst chooses
a bonus rate b ≥ 0, and then all workers observe this rate – the contract oﬀered
to them – and simultaneously choose their individual eﬀorts xi.11 Hence, a pure
strategy for the owner is a real number b ∈ R+, and a pure strategy for a worker i is
a function ξi : R+ → R+ that assigns an eﬀort level, xi = ξi (b), to every bonus rate
b. We solve this game for symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium, that is, subgame
perfect equilibria in which all workers use the same strategy.
For any bonus rate b ∈ [0,1], let XNE (b) be the set of eﬀort levels x such that   x =
(x,x,...,x) is a Nash equilibrium under that bonus rate. A strategy pair (b∗,ξ∗), where
b∗ is the owner’s strategy and ξ∗ the common strategy for the workers, constitutes
a symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium if and only if ξ∗ selects a common Nash
equilibrium eﬀort level for each bonus rate, and b∗ maximizes the owner’s proﬁt,
given ξ∗:
[E1] ξ∗ (b) ∈ XNE (b) ∀b ≥ 0
[E2] b∗ ∈ argmaxb∈[0,1] F [nξ∗ (b)] − nbξ∗ (b)
3.1. Selﬁsh workers. As a benchmark, let us ﬁrst consider the standard case of
workers motivated solely by their material utility, g ≡ 0. From (6) it is immediate
that workers’ decisions concerning eﬀort are strategically independent. Hence, re-














Consequently, the unique Nash equilibrium eﬀort level, under any bonus rate b ≥ 0,
is xo (b) = b/n for all workers i – one nth of the socially ideal eﬀort level. Inserting
this equilibrium response to any bonus rate oﬀered into the expression for the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt, we obtain
π = F (b) − b
2. (13)
11In the section below we will also analyse the case where workers can reject the contract and
take an outside option in its stead. For now, we shall assume that workers are stuck with their ﬁrm.
This can be seen as a short-run analysis (where the labor market is sticky) but it mainly simpliﬁes
the exposition of the general mechanics induced by a social norm in a ﬁrm.Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms 10
Hence, the owner’s optimal choice of bonus rate is uniquely characterized by the
ﬁrst-order condition F′ (b) = 2b. In particular, for F linear, the solution is bo = 1/2.
In sum: in the case of selﬁsh workers and linear production, there exists a unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the owner oﬀers a 50/50 split
of the ﬁrms’ revenue with the team of workers. Workers’ common eﬀort level on
the equilibrium path is xo (bo) = 1/(2n), they each earn income 1/(4n2) and obtain
(material) utility 1/(8n2). The owner makes proﬁt 1/4. Clearly, there is free-riding
among workers in this unique equilibrium: their common equilibrium eﬀort is only
one nth of their socially ideal eﬀort level, ˆ x(b) ≡ b. Hence, if they could, they would
like to collectively commit to this higher eﬀort level. Under the equilibrium bonus
rate bo = 1/2, each worker’s income would rise to 1/4 and their material utility would
rise to 1/8. Even the owner’s proﬁt would increase, to n/4.
3.2. Workers with team spirit. Having studied the benchmark case of selﬁsh
workers, we now return to the general case. For any bonus rate b ≥ 0 chosen by the
owner, an eﬀort proﬁle (x∗
1,...,x∗


















(n − 1)(xi − b),
b
n
(n − 1)(¯ x−i − b)
￿
(14)
for each worker i. We henceforth assume that g is twice diﬀerentiable and that it is
increasing and concave in its ﬁrst argument: g1 ≥ 0 and g11 < 0.12 In this case, a
necessary and suﬃcient condition for (14) to hold, for any given positive bonus rate











(n − 1)(xi − b),
b
n
(n − 1)(¯ x−i − b)
￿
. (15)
Focusing on symmetric equilibria, we note that the set of such equilibrium eﬀort










(n − 1)(x − b),
b
n
(n − 1)(x − b)
￿￿
. (16)
It follows immediately from this observation that no symmetric equilibrium eﬀort is
lower than the unique equilibrium eﬀort of selﬁsh workers:
12Both the material and social utilities are then concave functions of the worker’s own eﬀort, and
the sum of two concave functions is concave, so also total utility is concave.
13To see that each worker’s eﬀort necessarily is positive in equilibrium, note that the maximand
in (14) is diﬀerentiable with respect to xi, with positive derivative at xi = 0, whenever b > 0.Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms 11
Proposition 1. If b > 0 and x∗ ∈ XNE(b), then x∗ ≥ xo (b).
What about existence of symmetric equilibria, for arbitrary bonus rates b ≥ 0?
We will show below that a suﬃcient condition for existence is g1 (0,0) ≤ 1. This is
a natural condition in many situations. Some technical regularity conditions aside,
the condition is met, with a margin, if an agent’s social utility is maximal when all
workers exert the socially ideal eﬀort.14 To see this, consider the eﬀect of changes in
i’s eﬀort on his or her own social utility, when all others exert the socially eﬃcient
eﬀort:
∂vi(  x, ˆ x)
∂xi











In “typical” applications, such as the present one, the sum is positive. Hence, a
necessary condition for i’s social utility to be maximal when all workers exert the
socially ideal eﬀort is g1 (0,0) = 0, and hence g1 (0,0) ≤ 1.
Proposition 2. If g1 (0,0) ≤ 1, then there exists at least one symmetric Nash equi-
librium with common eﬀort level b/n ≤ x∗ ≤ b.
Proof Suppose b ≥ 0. By deﬁnition, g1 ≥ 0. Hence, φ(x) ≥ b/n for all x ≥ 0, so
x∗ ≥ b/n is necessary for symmetric Nash equilibrium. Moreover, g1 (0,0) ≤ 1
implies φ(b) ≤ b. Since φ is continuous, φ(x∗) = x∗ for some x∗ ∈ [b/n,b]. ￿
In general, it is not an easy task to ﬁnd and characterize the set of SSPE, the
main reason being the non-linearity of the model and the possibility of multiple Nash
equilibrium eﬀort levels for a given bonus rate b. Rather than embarking on a general
and abstract analysis, we move on to a diagrammatic exposition of a special case,
showing what can happen within the present model framework.
Example. Suppose the social utility to worker i is linear in the externality he imposes
on the others, and logistic in the externality they impose on him. It is thus as if each
worker cares logistically more about the material externality he imposes on the others
in the team, the more the other team members contribute themselves. Formally, let
g(zi,z−i) ≡
λeσz−i
1 + eσz−i   zi
14The condition fails if some individual maximizes his or her social payoﬀ by being “over zealous,”
that is, by exceeding the socially ideal eﬀort when all others stick to the social ideal. We believe
this case to be an exception rather than the rule.Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms 12
for parameters λ,σ > 0. Clearly, g is twice diﬀerentiable, has a positive partial



















Figure ?? shows the graph of this function, for b = 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 (for n = 5,
λ = 1.5 and σ = 20). The higher the bonus rate, the higher is the corresponding
graph’s initial value, φ(0) (and this is also true for the asymptotic values, but not
for all intermediate values). For each of the two lower bonus rates there is a unique
equilibrium, and we see that the equilibrium eﬀort is somewhat higher when the
bonus rate is 0.5 (the optimal bonus rate for selﬁsh workers) than when it is 0.25.
But is also the proﬁt higher? We will return to this question in the next diagram,
but ﬁrst we note that for the highest bonus rate, b = 0.75, there are thee equilibrium
eﬀort levels.










Figure 1: The ﬁxed-point equation for eﬀort, given the bonus rate.
The possibility of multiple equilibria raises the question whether there is a system-
atic way to select among them. We ﬁnd it reasonable to disregard the intermediate
equilibrium as is unstable under adaptive expectations; the slightest perturbation of
workers’ expectations will lead their eﬀorts away from that level. By contrast, each
of the other two equilibria is stable under adaptive expectations. Given the bonusSocial Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms 13
rate, b = 0.75, the collective decision problem that the team faces is essentially that
of a n-player coordination game, and it can be argued that, in a practical situation of
this sort, the team members will talk with each other before they individually decide
whether to take the high or low equilibrium eﬀort. It is plausible that this will lead the
team-members to coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium. Indeed, there is
experimental evidence in favor of this hypothesis, for example in Van Huyck, Battalio,
and Beil (1990). Moreover, for the case of two players facing a symmetric and ﬁnite
coordination game, there is some theoretical basis for this selection too.15 Demichelis
and Weibull (2008) generalize the cheap-talk model of pre-play communication by
allowing messages to have a pre-existing meaning and players to have a lexicographic
preference against lying. They show that, in generic coordination games with such
pre-play communication, the Pareto eﬃcient Nash equilibrium component is the only
one that is evolutionarily stable. Which of the two equilibria in this example, for
b = 0.75, Pareto dominates the other? Again, we postpone the answer until after we
have considered the next diagram, which shows (for the same parameter values as in
Figure 1) the graph of the equilibrium correspondence from bonus rates b ∈ (0,1)
to equilibrium eﬀort levels, x > 0, along with iso-proﬁt curves for the case of linear
production. The dashed straight line is the graph of the equilibrium correspondence
for the case of selﬁsh workers, x = b/n.
15By contrast, certain models without pre-play communication instead lead to the long-run pre-
diction, for generic 2 × 2 coordination games, that it instead the risk-dominant equilibrium that is
selected, see Kandori, Mailath and Rob (2003) and Young (1993).Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms 14










Figure 2: The correspondence from bonus rates to equilibrium eﬀort levels.
A number of remarks can be made. First, we note that the lowest iso-proﬁt curve
(π = 0.25) just touches the equilibrium line x = b/n for selﬁsh workers from above
at the proﬁt-maximizing bonus rate, b = 0.5, for such workers. Hence, higher proﬁts
can be obtained under team pay with team-spirited workers than with selﬁsh workers.
For instance, the bonus rate b = 0.3 results in proﬁts π ≈ 0.7 and is a locally proﬁt-
maximizing bonus rate. Is it also globally proﬁt-maximizing in this example, if we
use the suggested equilibrium selection principle? The other candidate bonus rate for
proﬁt maximization in this example is b ≈ 0.71, which results in proﬁt π ≈ 1.25, in
the subgame perfect equilibrium with the high-eﬀort equilibrium. If the high-eﬀort
equilibrium Pareto-dominates the low-eﬀort equilibrium, for the team of workers, then
this will be the globally proﬁt-maximizing bonus rate under the suggested equilibrium
selection principle.
In the present numerical example (with n = 5 and λ = 1.5), the total utility to a
worker, when all workers exert the same eﬀort x and the bonus rate is b, is











For b = 0.71 and x ≈ 0.16 (the low equilibrium eﬀort), we obtain U ≈ 0.10 while
for b = 0.71 and x ≈ 0.90 (the high equilibrium eﬀort), we obtain U ≈ 0.38. Hence,
the high-eﬀort equilibrium does Pareto dominate the low-eﬀort equilibrium, and the
optimal contract for the owner is thus to oﬀer the high bonus b = 0.71. UnderSocial Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms 15
this bonus rate, workers will be over-zealous and contribute above the social ideal
(x = 0.71). We note that the proﬁt is much higher than had the workers been selﬁsh.
The high bonus brings forth a very strong team spirit, resulting in a high proﬁt to
the owner – and high total utility to each worker. Thus, in this example, market
selection in favor of more proﬁtable ﬁrms also favors the high-eﬀort equilibrium.
A phenomenon illustrated by Figure 2 is that an increase in the bonus rate can
lead to reduced eﬀorts. This is the case, for example, if the bonus rate is raised
from b = 0.35 to, say, b = 0.45. It is thus as if economic incentives can crowd out
social incentives. This phenomenon can be understood by studying equation (15),
which shows that an increase in the bonus rate b has three eﬀects on a worker’s eﬀort
(holding other workers’ eﬀorts constant). First, it increases i’s economic incentive to
exert eﬀort, by way of the monetary reward to the team. It also increases the worker’s
social incentive to exert eﬀort, since an increase in the bonus, if not accompanied by
an increase in own eﬀort, decreases the (positive) externality imposed on other team
members. However, an increase in the bonus rate also reduces the worker’s incentive
to exert eﬀort, since other team members’ (positive) externality upon him decreases as
the bonus rate goes up (recall that their eﬀorts are ﬁxed in this thought experiment)
– which diminishes the peer pressure felt by the worker. If this third, peer pressure,
eﬀect outweighs the ﬁrst two, then the worker will reduce his eﬀort if the bonus rate
is increased and the others eﬀorts would be ﬁxed. But the same reasoning applies to
them, so they will also reduce their eﬀorts, resulting in a downward spiral in eﬀorts
until a lower-eﬀort equilibrium, associated with the new and higher bonus rate, has
been reached.
Another phenomenon illustrated by Figure 2 is that a slight change in the bonus
rate can result in a discontinuous jump in work eﬀort. For instance, a gradual shift
downwards of the bonus rate, from its optimal value b = 0.71, will lead to a sudden and
drastic decrease in workers’ eﬀort when the bonus rate is about 0.69, from x ≈ 0.87
to x ≈ 0.11. As the bonus rate continues to shift downward, we would observe ﬁrst a
very slight decrease, then a continuous increase and ﬁnally a continuous decrease in
eﬀort. All of this, the discontinuity and non-monotonicity, is due to the endogenous
social incentive. It appears that the non-monotonicity is a fundamental and robust
phenomenon, while discontinuities arise only in case workers are quite sensitive to
others’ eﬀorts in their consideration of these others’ welfare. For instance, if instead
of λ = 1.5 in our numerical example (but otherwise the same parameters) we would
have λ = 1 (or lower), the subgame equilibrium is unique for all bonus rates, see
Figure 3 below.Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms 16










Figure 3: The correspondence from bonus rates to equilibrium eﬀort levels, when
λ = 1.
The crowding-out of the social incentive still occurs, and the proﬁt-maximizing
bonus rate is approximately 0.28, still far below that for selﬁsh workers (b = 0.5).
Evidently the owner earns a higher proﬁt than had the workers been selﬁsh. What
about the workers’ material utility. Is it higher or lower when they have social prefer-
ences than when they are selﬁsh, under the proﬁt-maximizing contract for each case?
Their material equilibrium utility under any bonus rate b and common eﬀort level x
is u∗ = (b/n − x/2)x. Hence, if they would be selﬁsh and the bonus rate accordingly
were b = 0.5, their material utility would be u∗ = 0.005, while if they would have the
social preferences of this example, and the bonus rate accordingly were b ≈ 0.28, their
material utility would be u∗ ≈ −0.007. Hence, their concern for each others’ welfare
in the end beneﬁts the owner but is detrimental to their material well-being.16
Before we move on, let us brieﬂy summarize the key eﬀects of social norms that
we have seen here:
• Social norms always increase eﬀorts in this team-pay framework and, conse-
quently, a ﬁrm owner will be better oﬀ when her workers are sensitive to social
work norms.
16For this example, we neglect participation constraints, which might be violated with social
norms but satisﬁed without social norms.Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms 17
• Social norms can induce over-zealousness. In equilibrium, workers might work
harder than their social ideal.
• More high-powered monetary incentives can crowd out social-norm incentives
and actually reduce equilibrium eﬀorts.
4. Relative-performance pay
Under team pay, a worker’s eﬀort is a positive externality for other workers–an
increase in i’s eﬀort increases j’s income and hence material utility, ceteris paribus.
We saw that a social norm derived from externalities then works in favor of the
ﬁrm owner. In other environments, such as when there is an element of competition
between the workers, one worker’s eﬀort may cause a negative externality on others–
an increase in i’s eﬀort may decrease j’s income. Can a social norm then work
against the owner’s interest? If social utilities (induced, perhaps, through peer
pressure) make workers compete less hard with each other, then social preferences of
the form modelled here may restrain their eﬀorts and cause proﬁts to be lower than
if workers had only material utilities. Under such contracts, will social preferences
among workers reduce proﬁts? Enhance workers’ material utility?
In order to analyze this in a simple and clear setting, suppose now that the owner
observes each worker’s eﬀort (or individual output) with some noise and pays the
worker with the highest observed eﬀort (or individual output) a lump-sum bonus, or
award, a > 0. With otherwise the same model speciﬁcation, let xi ≥ 0 be worker i’s
eﬀort and let ˜ xi = xi + εi be the eﬀort observed by the owner. For any eﬀort proﬁle




i/2 if ˜ xi > ˜ xj ∀j  = i
−x2
i/2 if ˜ xi < ˜ xj for some j  = i
Assuming the noise terms to be statistically independent and to have a density, the
probability for a tie is zero and can hence be neglected. We focus on the analytically
convenient case of Gumbel-distributed noise terms, in which case the expected utility
for each worker is a logistic function of all workers’ eﬀorts:
ui (a,  x) = E[˜ ui] =
aeθxi
￿n
j=1 eθxj − x
2
i/2
for some θ > 0 (a parameter inversely related to the standard deviation of the noise
term). The unique eﬀort proﬁle that maximizes the sum of all worker’s material
utility, given any award a ≥ 0 is   x = (0,0...,0), that is, noone exerts any eﬀort. This
is no surprise, since exactly one member of the team will receive the award (lump-sumSocial Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms 18
bonus), irrespective of individual eﬀorts, and therefore eﬀorts are wasteful from the
team’s point of view. Let thus the social ideal for all workers be ˆ x = 0.
In the case of selﬁsh workers, the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium eﬀort proﬁle,
given the award a > 0, is again proportional to the reward (though now it is a lump-
sum while before it was a rate):
x








We note that the more precise the owner’s eﬀort observations, the more eﬀort each
worker exerts, and the more workers there are in the team, the less will each of them
work. The proﬁt to the owner is total output, which we take to be increasing in the








for some twice diﬀerentiable production function F meeting the usual Inada condi-











This maximization program has a unique solution, ao > 0, characterized by the ﬁrst-
order condition












We now introduce social preferences in the same manner as before, where
ψi (xi, ˆ x−i) = (n − 1)  
eθxi − 1
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The ﬁxed-point equation for symmetric Nash equilibrium becomes




(n + eθx − 1)
2  g1
￿
(n − 1)  
eθx − 1












Since g1 > 0, any equilibrium eﬀort (there may be multiple symmetric equilibria)
will be lower in the presence of social preferences. This is not surprising, since the
incentive scheme is such that one workers’ eﬀort is a negative externality for the
others. Hence, in the case of relative-performance pay, a social norm among team
members is detrimental for the owner.
Example. Using the same g-function as in the case of team-pay, and parameter



















5   1−ex
1+4ex
￿.




























which shows that the equilibrium eﬀort is approximately linear in the award rate.
The diagram below shows the graph of the (exact) equilibrium correspondence from
the award, a, to the equilibrium eﬀort level, x. This is the lower full curve in the
diagram, indeed looking much like a straight line to the eye. The more steeply sloped
dashed curve is this correspondence in the case of selﬁsh workers; they react stronger
to the monetary incentive. The two thin curves are iso-proﬁt curves, drawn for the
production function F (x1 + ... + xn) ≡
√
x1 + ... + xn. The two thin vertical lines
indicate the associated optimal awards, a0 = 0.2 in the case of selﬁsh workers, and
a∗ ≈ 0.1 in the case of workers with social preferences. The two thin horizontal lines
indicate the corresponding equilibrium eﬀort levels.17
17We obtain x0 = 0.032 when a = 0.2, for selﬁsh workers. Solving the ﬁxed-point equation under
the Taylor approximation, we obtain x∗ ≈ 0.007972 when a = 0.1 for workers with social preferences.
These are the two thin horizontal lines.Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms 20










Figure 4: The correspondence from awards to equilibrium eﬀorts, under
relative-performance pay.
We note that the social norm harms the ﬁrm’s proﬁt. More exactly, the proﬁt-
maximizing award in the presence of the norm, a∗ ≈ 0.1 is smaller than the optimal
award in the case of selﬁsh workers, ao ≈ 0.2. In the ﬁrst case, worker’s eﬀort level is








5   0.032 − 0.2 ≈ 0.2





















Hence, selﬁsh workers not only make the employer better oﬀ, but also obtain higher
expected material utility themselves than workers with social preferences. The em-
ployer gives more high-powered incentives to selﬁsh workers and they respond by
working harder. Nevertheless, they are better oﬀ than workers with social prefer-
ences in material terms as the higher award overcompensates them for the higher
eﬀort level.Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms 21
5. Discussion
Social norms root in externalities. They encourage actions that induce positive and
discourage actions that induce negative externalities. The strength of the social norm
may depend on how well others adhere to it. These are the basic premises of our paper
that develops a general framework for studying social norms in economic contexts.
This framework is fully ﬂexible and can be applied to any economic context where
externalities are important.
The fundamental observation we make is that in a very simple model of a ﬁrm,
economic incentives can determine the sign of the eﬀect that social norms have on
actions. One and the same social norm can be eﬃciency enhancing, neutral, or ef-
ﬁciency decreasing depending on the type of contract used. More speciﬁcally, we
show that with team pay social norms enhance eﬃciency while relative-performance
incentives render norms detrimental. This suggests the importance of “norm man-
agement” when a principal designs a contract.18 In particular, team pay emerges as
an incentive scheme that can generate eﬀort-enhancing social pressure.19 Moreover,
we demonstrate that social norms make the optimal design of economic incentives
tricky as there can be multiplicity of equilibria, jumps, and crowding out.
The paper raises many new questions. First of all, one can explore the robustness
of our results in a variety of settings. (In an older version of this paper, we examined
sequential production, franchises, binding outside options, etc.) But there are also
other types of questions. An obvious one concerns the issue of equilibrium selection
on which we have only touched upon. One possible avenue for future research is to
apply tools from evolutionary game theory to investigate this in more detail.
Another question concerns the endogeneity of the social norm. In our model we
have assumed that workers have social preferences and we have not studied where
these preferences originate from. Intuitively, one might suspect that agents who have
such preferences have an evolutionary disadvantage since others (with standard pref-
erences) can always free ride on them. However, a key observation for understanding
the evolution of work norms is that the matching between workers and ﬁrms is typ-
ically not random (as normally assumed in evolutionary models and implicit in the
above argument for why free-riders should survive). Rather workers apply to selected
ﬁrms and ﬁrms select applicants after careful interviewing. Firms care a lot about
dimensions that can be summarized under “personality”.20 A version of our team
18See K¨ ubler (2001) on the similar notion of “norm regulation”.
19A related argument in favor of team work is provided by Che and Yoo (2001). They show that
team pay can be optimal in a dynamic setting even if individual contributions are veriﬁable. Implicit
contracts, i.e. sanctions against free riders by other team members, increase eﬀort levels beyond
those achieved by contracts based on individual performance.
20See, for example, the recent article by Highhouse (2002) who discusses the advantages of theSocial Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms 22
production model can explain why this is the case. As the equilibria in the eﬀort
game are Pareto-ranked, our ﬁrm would try to select workers who are sensitive to
peer pressure. Firms that do not care for the “personality” of their workers would
consistently earn less than others, and might therefore ultimately disappear.
For workers, similar dynamics may apply. Those who are insensitive to peer pres-
sure would only be selected by ﬁrms with a lower “work morale,” that is, by ﬁrms
that in equilibrium pay less and that face a bigger risk of being shut down. This im-
plies a double disadvantage for workers who are insensitive to social norms and who
would free-ride. They earn lower wages and they are more likely to lose their jobs.
Hence, evolutionary selection may operate in favor of workers who are sensitive to
peer pressure in such settings. Interestingly, the opposite holds true for tournaments.
A ﬁrm using relative performance schemes would like to select workers who are in-
sensitive to social pressure. Thus, diﬀerent incentive schemes can lead to sorting of
worker types, a phenomenon which may be related to certain personality diﬀerences
observed between the private and the public sector.21
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